The Great Pretenders
It is 50 years ago Wednesday that economist Friedrich Hayek accepts his Nobel Prize with a warning about economists.
It will be 50 years on Wednesday since economist Friedrich Hayekâs Nobel Prize lecture, âThe Pretense of Knowledge,â our Alex Pollock reminds us. That was the speech in which Hayek decried the âaccelerating inflationâ of the day â and the bitter irony that it had âbeen brought about by policies which the majority of economists recommended and even urged governments to pursue.â He concluded: âAs a profession we have made a mess of things.â
It was of a piece with Hayekâs role as a contrarian in the economics profession that his âbrilliant presentation,â Mr. Pollock notes, âexplained the inherent limits of economics and the inevitable failure of trying to make it a predictive mathematical science.â Fifty years on, Hayekâs warning âapplies particularly to central banks and their yearning to be economic philosopher-kings,â Mr. Pollock adds. Is this anniversary being marked by the pretenders at the Fed?
After all, nowhere is the gap between the âpretense of knowledgeâ and practical outcomes wider than at the Fed. This was marked in September by the Wall Street Journal in an editorial headlined âHas the Fed Learned Any Lessons?â Published as the Fed was readying to lower interest rates in the aftermath of âthe worst inflation in 40 years,â the editorial noted that âno one should forget the monetary mistakesâ that led to the wave of price increases.
The groundwork for that disaster can be traced to the experimental Quantitative Easing program launched by Chairman Ben Bernanke in 2008. Mr. Bernanke scoffed at inflation fears over his runup of the Fedâs balance sheet, pledging that if inflation showed signs of reviving, âwe could raise interest rates in 15 minutes, if we have to.â The result was a reckless accumulation of trillions of dollars in assets, accompanied by artificially low interest rates.
Mr. Bernankeâs confidence upon launching QE â a Grade-A âpretense of knowledgeâ â was striking in light of his, and the Fedâs, failure to foresee the 2008 financial meltdown. âThe crisis came from causes not captured by the new Keynesian models used at the Fed,â the Fed chairman later explained by way of an excuse. His colleague and successor at the Fed, Secretary Yellen, similarly shrugged that âI wouldnât have seen it in the data.â
Mrs. Yellen apologized later âthat light bulbs didnât go off in my head a couple of years before they really did.â Chairman Jay Powell wasnât as forthright in apologizing for dismissing as âtransitoryâ the early signals of inflation in 2021. The best he could muster was to say that âThe one piece of guidance that we gave that I probably wouldnât do again,â he said, âis we said we wouldnât lift off unless â until we saw both maximum employment and price stability.â
That convoluted Fed-speak, the Washington Post had to explain, was Mr. Powellâs way of admitting he shouldnât have waited to raise interest rates. The problem uniting all three Fed chiefs, though, was an overreliance on what proved to be flawed economic models instead of looking to the basis of monetary value â gold. Before the Fedâs QE, the dollar was worth a 775th of an ounce of gold. Four years later it had plummeted to less than a 1,700th.
That was a warning of incipient inflation. Similarly, the Biden inflation wave was accompanied by the dollar plunging even further, to less than a 2,700th of an ounce of gold. âThereâs something off,â these columns noted in 2014, about Mr. Bernanke and Mrs. Yellen âblithely talking about how they didnât see trouble in the dataâ even as they continued âto ignore the signals in gold.â We reminded that âa search always ends in the last place one looks.â
The refusal to consider gold as a factor in monetary deliberations reflects the failure to heed Hayekâs warning of 50 years ago. Mr. Pollock conveys a hope that institutions like the Fed âhave taken to heart Hayekâs lesson that the âinsuperable limits to knowledgeâ ought to teach humility.â Central bankers, in Mr. Pollockâs telling, have reason to be âskeptical about their own forced guessing.â Yet if there is one thing that is in short supply at the Fed, itâs humility.