In this episode of Sages of the Sun, we discuss President Biden’s shift on Taiwan with a special guest from the Council on Foreign Relations, David Sacks.

Mr. Sacks is a research fellow whose work focuses on U.S.-China relations, U.S.-Taiwan relations, Chinese foreign policy, and cross-Strait relations. Mr. Sacks was a co-author of the council’s task force report on China’s Belt and Road Initiative and writes extensively on U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Prior to joining CFR, Mr. Sacks worked on political military affairs at the American Institute in Taiwan, which handles the full breadth of the United States’ relationship with Taiwan in the absence of diplomatic relations.

VIK: Thank you for joining us, David. I’m eager to hear how you’re looking at the situation. Is this a meaningful shift? Is it not? What can we expect and how should we be thinking about that?

SACKS: People are talking about Biden’s remarks in Tokyo from last weekend. And you know, what I would say about that is that, to me, I would not discount his remarks. You know, this is the third time that he has said something to that effect. The first time [with] George Stephanopoulos in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, then again, when he was asked, you know, in very similar terms, pretty much point blank whether the United States would defend Taiwan at a CNN town hall and then again at his press availability with Prime Minister Kishida over the weekend. People will try to chalk it up as a gaffe and his administration, all three times, has sought to walk back his comments and kind of explain them away, but I would just offer up a few pieces of context.  Number one, I think we should remember that President Biden comes to his presidency with a deep background in foreign affairs and foreign policy. He voted for the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. As a Senator, you know, he served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He’s traveled the world, including to Taiwan as a senator. This is not somebody without foreign policy experience. The second thing I would say is that even with the walkbacks from the administration when push comes to shove, if China were to use force against Taiwan, the decision of whether to come to Taiwan’s defense is up to one person, and that’s the president. And to me, it is now clear where President Biden stands on this question and what his decision would be. And my objection to walking the comments back is that I think that at this point, does sow confusion among U.S. allies and partners in the region. I think it also contributes to a picture of dysfunction and of a divide between the President and his advisors or the rest of his administration. And so I think at this point, it would have been much better to let his comments stand and then figure out how to implement this policy, which to me is the much more pressing issue. So of course, you have U.S. declaratory policy on whether you would come to Taiwan’s defense, but then ensuring that we have the capabilities to do so is a whole ‘nother matter. And I think that having seen where the President is on this, it now should become much more of a priority in the Department of Defense and elsewhere, to ensure that we have the capacity to make good on that pledge.

VIK: Fascinating. So, okay, a couple questions. One, you know, in your view, why are they walking it back? I agree with you. I think he’s made it clear multiple times, including in remarks, it’s not like that’s an off the cuff comment. So given that it’s pretty clear where the President as an individual lies, why do you think his administration continues to walk it back and what do you think’s going on there?

SACKS: Yeah, I mean, so there, there is a big debate, kind of in, in the administration, as well as more broadly in kind of China-watching circles and Taiwan-watching circles about whether a shift to what Richard Haass and I termed “strategic clarity” would actually provoke a Chinese response that you do not want or that you’re trying to avoid, and so proponents of what we term “strategic ambiguity” say that actually shifting to clarity would provoke the Chinese, and so when you hear, for instance, the Director of National Intelligence, Avril Haines, when she testified maybe a year ago on the Hill, she was asked this question about shifting to strategic clarity. She said that the intelligence community’s assessment was that it would be exculpatory and provocative. So I think there is a view in the administration that essentially we don’t want to provoke the Chinese and this is what would do it. I think that they’re comfortable assuming that the Chinese believe that we would intervene. So why do you have to say it — say the quiet part out loud? That’s their view, if I could try to channel it.

VIK: So would you classify that as intentional confusion?

SACKS: So I don’t think that they would call it “intentional confusion.” I think what they would term it is essentially, the Chinese plan for U.S. intervention, the Chinese assume for U.S. intervention., so why do we have to tell them we would intervene? That’s the proponent of strategic ambiguity., but as Richard and I argued, I don’t think that strategic ambiguity necessarily deters a much more capable and much more risk-tolerant China. And I’m not sure that Xi Jinping is sure that the U.S. would intervene on Taiwan’s behalf. I think strategic ambiguity served its purpose for four decades, with a much weaker China militarily and much stronger United States from a relative, you know, military balance, but I don’t think strategic ambiguity is sufficient to deal with with Xi Jinping and Xi Jinping’s China, that that’s what I would say. And I would also say that, you know, President Biden has said this three times now and not once after his remarks were made, has China, you know, done something to really escalate. So at some point to me, the people who say “well, this will surely provoke China” need to revisit their assumptions. That’s my view.

AVNI: So what’s your view on what Blinken said today? Basically, that was a hard walk back.

SACKS: I think that the walk-backs are actually also counterproductive because there’s the danger that you walk back to a place that’s actually less than where we were with strategic ambiguity because it’s actually the definition of strategic ambiguity. For those who might not be as steeped in this kind of stuff, it’s basically, we did Chinese — we wouldn’t intervene on Taiwan’s behalf so they had to assume we would and prepare for U.S. intervention, but Taiwan could not assume that we would intervene under every circumstance. So then, therefore, they couldn’t take certain risks or provoke the Chinese because if we deem that they were provoking the Chinese, we might choose to stand aside, but the reason why I’m saying that is because with strategic ambiguity, there always was the prospect of direct U.S. military intervention. And now some of these walk-backs seem to almost take that off the table and say that well, we wouldn’t intervene directly on Taiwan’s behalf. And what I’m thinking of is, is one of the administration walk-backs, which was essentially that “oh, what he meant was we would provide Taiwan’s military hardware,. We do it, right?”

So I think that —

VIK: I mean, do you see this as a good cop, bad cop? Is the President on board with the walkbacks? 

SACKS: I’m not really sure. I mean, I don’t think that there’s a lot of intentionality here. You know, I don’t think that this is like we’re being strategically ambiguous or something like that. I don’t see that.

VIK: Isn’t the President saying like, “hey guys, why are you walking back my comments?”

SACKS: Well, I think that he should be because I think that it’s a mistake to continue to undermine the president of the United States. I mean, to me, like I said at the outset, his words are the most important thing here. And we know where he stands on this issue now. So regardless of a walk back, we know how he would act. That’s my view. That’s number one, but number two, I’m from the school of thought where a president’s words mean something — and so, we had, you know, the red line debacle in Syria, in the Obama administration — and I think that we have to be in a position where the words of the president of the United States are taken seriously around the world and we shouldn’t get into the habit of continuing to walk back the president’s statements because that’s not how you deter potential foes.

VIK:. Agreed. So from you know, getting to your point about implementation and what it would take to follow through on the President’s comments and intent here. You know, what can you tell us?

SACKS: Yeah, I mean, you know, so during the last administration, the National Defense Strategy prioritized China, which was a big shift, and I think an overdue shift. And that’s significant for, as you know, for how the Department of Defense allocates resources and prioritizes. Now, there was very interesting testimony again, you know, maybe a little under a year ago or so, by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Eli Ratner, where he said that China is the pacing challenge, which is a significant term in the Pentagon, and that Taiwan is the pacing scenario. So essentially indicating that for the military services, and for our planners, that Indo-Pacific Command, this is the scenario to prioritize and to throw resources at and I think that was a very strong statement. It did get a lot of attention when he made that statement. And I think that’s the right thing. And so what does it mean to identify Taiwan as the pacing scenario? I mean, I think that we see, for instance, the Marine Corps has a very controversial force design that they’ve unveiled, but it’s essentially kind of island hopping. In the Pacific and shooting missiles at potential, you know, PLA vessels, et cetera. The Army is also developing concepts that would allow it to be more agile and more relevant in the Pacific. And so is the Air Force for instance. So those are all good, but they’re very nascent concepts. And I think that there’s a fear that well, we can’t necessarily wait for those to materialize and bear fruit in ten years because we don’t know if a conflict comes, when it’s going to come, and we could be in a vulnerable period in the next five to seven years. So the capabilities that I’m thinking of, just to name a few, I mean, our submarine capability is much stronger than China’s, and China’s anti-submarine warfare capability is still relatively weak. So I would like to see the United States shift more submarines for deployment in Japan and elsewhere in the Pacific. I think that has to be a priority. You know, missiles are going to be key for this. And so we have to, you know, produce a lot more missiles and also deploy those — coordination with Japan is critical. So talking about contingency planning with the Japanese, getting an understanding of the role that Japan is ready and willing to play in a Taiwan conflict is very important. And then, of course, you know, as I wrote about last week, we have to learn lessons from how Ukraine is beating back a conventionally superior foe in Russia, and Taiwan is learning those lessons. I think there is a sense of urgency in Taiwan at this point. And so we have to work with Taiwan to make sure that they are procuring similar weapons that Ukraine is using. Javelins, stingers, drones, and things like that. And Taiwan has to really prioritize them as well. We term an asymmetric defense strategy over buying you know, much more expensive platforms like fighter jets and tanks. And what I would add to that, too, is I think the lesson from the war in Ukraine that Taiwan has to take is that it can’t just be up to its military — which is under 200,000 strong — to beat back the People’s Liberation Army. It really has to be a whole-of-society effort. And so what Taiwan needs to do is really focus on developing a competent reserve corps, territorial defense force, and essentially making sure that citizens defend their towns and their cities, because really, all 24 million people on Taiwan are going to have to be involved in defending the island if it’s going to be effective.

AVNI: I have a question, a quick question on ambiguity. The policy as has been declared for many years is One-China. 

However, today Blinken said that the U.S. opposes Taiwan’s independence. Is that taking it a little further than the established policy, or is it exactly the same?

SACKS: So, I would have to look at the exact text that Blinken used because I’ve been in this conference all day, so I actually haven’t been able to study it yet. But the U.S. policy, which is slightly different, should be that we do not support Taiwan independence.

AVNI: That’s what he said.

So okay, so then that is U.S. policy, but that’s different than saying we opposed Taiwan independence, which is kind of a faux pas to say officially, but to not support Taiwan independence is consistent with our One-China policy. So that wouldn’t be a shift.

AVNI: And what do you think of that?

SACKS: I think that’s the prudent policy. You know, to me, actually, when you look at public polling in Taiwan, there’s very little support for unification as one would imagine, but actually, the vast majority of voters support the status quo because they are pragmatic and they realize that while it might not be the optimal outcome for them, they realize that a unilateral declaration of independence would provoke a Chinese use of force, which they want to avoid. And so we can have debates, for instance, about how prepared China’s military is to invade Taiwan. We can have those debates, but I have no doubt that if Taiwan declared independence tomorrow, Xi Jinping would order the PLA to attack Taiwan, regardless of their preparedness or their readiness. Because for the CCP and for Xi Jinping, that’s politically unacceptable. So while right now this is less than optimal from Taiwan’s perspective, you know, I do think it beats the alternative, which is essentially a war that they don’t want with China. That would be devastating. So you know, Taiwan does not have a seat in the United Nations. It can’t participate in various UN organizations to the extent that it would like to, but it is, you know, at this point, de facto, if not de jure, independent, and that’s what Taiwan, you know, wants to protect. It is politically autonomous. Even if Beijing, you know, does not recognize that. And so, you know, I do think that our position on Taiwan independence is prudence, and I would not, and I would not change it.

VIK: So we’re sort of threading the needle by saying we should fight to protect their de facto independence, but not support actual independence. Is that right?

SACKS: Well, you know, how we put it diplomatically is that we don’t want unilateral changes to the status quo. And we can define, we certainly define the status quo differently than the PRC defines the status quo. But for us, from the U.S. perspective, the status quo is that Taiwan has, you know, is autonomous. It is a member of the World Trade Organization. It’s a member of APEC. It is a top ten trading partner of the United States. It’s a thriving democracy, but we do not have formal diplomatic relations with the island. And so what I think Secretary Blinken and President Biden and our administration has been consistent on is that we cannot see unilateral changes to the status quo, but what is consistent with our policy is that if Taiwan chose, hypothetically, to unify with the mainland tomorrow, we also would not oppose that outcome. Because as long as the outcome has the consent of the people on Taiwan, that is acceptable to us. And I don’t see that happening anytime in the near future, but you know, I just put that out as one component of our policy. 

AVNI: Now what is our position on other countries having relations with — formal relations with — Taiwan, which, you know, China obviously, is quashing. You know, there were several countries in Latin America, there was Vanuatu I think, and even Solomon Islands had formal relations and China went to make sure that they don’t. What is the U.S. position on that?

SACKS: Yeah, I mean, you know, our position is that … that’s a sovereign decision that those countries can make, whether or not to have relations with Taiwan. So we don’t — we obviously don’t oppose that by any stretch of the imagination. And, you know, just to be, just to be clear, you know, no country in the world can have formal ties with both Taiwan and China. You have to pick and so all of those countries that maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan, do not have diplomatic ties with the PRC, though. So that’s a choice that each one has to make. But we are not opposed to countries having formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, obviously, that’s their sovereign — that’s their sovereign decision. But what I would add — sorry, just one more point — what I would add is that, I think from the Chinese perspective, counterintuitively, and I wrote about this a few years ago, I think it’s in their interest for Taiwan to have diplomatic allies, because those countries don’t recognize Taiwan actually, as an independent country. They recognize the Republic of China as the legal government of China, which actually includes, you know, technically Taiwan and the mainland. So, actually, it’s not as if Taiwan has declared independence. And then it has a dozen countries around the world who recognize it as an independent nation, which is just the island. Actually, all of these countries have formal diplomatic ties to the Republic of China. You know, which is very different.

VIK: On that point, David, you mentioned earlier, you know, what, Japan would do in the event that Taiwan was attacked, are there what — what other countries do we expect to come to Taiwan’s defense, if any, and in what ways?

SACKS: Yeah. So you know, there was an interesting comment made a number of months ago by Australia’s defense minister, I believe, that said he couldn’t imagine any scenario in which the United States came to Taiwan’s defense and Australia did not. And I think that’s a recognition of how close our alliance is with Australia … and I think as well, given how given the … becoming even closer with Australia with Aukus and the Quad, as well as you know, souring China-Australia relations, I would expect Australia to support the United States militarily, you know, I think that that would be helpful. I’m not sure you know how much the capabilities [of] Australia could offer, given how far away they are, but I would expect Australia to assist where they can. I also think that the Philippines would be one that we would want to have, clearly under Duterte, the Philippines was less supportive of the alliance. I think with the new administration coming in, it’s much more supportive of the alliance and if you look at a map, if China were to station its military on Taiwan, now it is much closer to the Philippines and I would argue [China] poses a much bigger threat to the Philippines. So I think that the Philippines will realize that it’s in their interest to resist Chinese aggression against Taiwan. And of course, if the United States was able to get access to Subic Bay and Clark Air Base, again, those are significant militarily for us. So you’re looking at the Philippines, Australia, Japan. You know, Taiwan — also featured in recent joint statements with South Korea, of course — with South Korea, it’s much, much more complicated because of, of course, North Korea and China’s ability to influence that situation. You know, I do think that the United States would look for various levels of direct military support from its treaty allies in Asia. And beyond that, I think that the United States would look to put together a global coalition to sanction China, which would include its European allies as well. So I don’t think the United States would look for NATO military support. But I think he would absolutely expect its NATO allies to support a sanctions regime on China.

VIK: And in terms of what you were talking about earlier, in terms of just actual, like whole-society defense of the island and what kinds of equipment would be most effective, I spoke to another military strategist a while ago and his point was, you know, an amphibious assault is a difficult thing and that it works to our advantage if we’re defending and it makes it almost impossible for us to, let’s say, help reclaim the island after the Chinese were to take it. So, how do you think about, you know, timing? It seems like timing, who’s defending, who’s attacking at what time, is critical. So if you were designing sort of the defense policy and how to actually defend the island —

SACKS: Yeah, I mean, I think the person you spoke to is 100 percent right. Dislodging the PLA from Taiwan would be enormously difficult and so, the mission for us has to be, you know, denying China its objectives and denying China the ability to take Taiwan in the first place. And so, and in terms of timing, you know, the reality is with China’s proximity to Taiwan, and with China’s significant military modernization that is all focused above all else, I would say, on developing capabilities for a Taiwan scenario. You know, the United States will need time to get into the fight. I’ll put it that way. And so that’s why it’s even more important that Taiwan has the capabilities to repel that initial invasion, force and prevent a successful, you know, landing and then a buildup of forces on a beachhead. So, you know, a couple of those capabilities that Taiwan is developing now. I mean, Taiwan does have an indigenous sea mine capability that’s important. It’s actually a capability that the United States has allowed to atrophy, because we don’t really think in those terms anymore in terms of our military. And Taiwan also has an indigenous anti-ship cruise missile that’s quite capable. And so that’s, that’s critical. Like I said before, javelins and stingers and drones are all going to be key here, as well as, you know, passive defenses. And one thing that I would put forward: one difference, one big difference between Taiwan and Ukraine — which might seem fairly obvious, but I think it’s worth highlighting — is that it has been relatively easy to continue to arm Ukraine because it shares land borders with NATO countries. And so the United States can fly in weapons to NATO countries, they can go overland into Ukraine and they can show up on the battlefield. But getting weapons onto an island where you’re going to have, potentially, a blockade around the island, as well as contested airspace over the island is going to be incredibly difficult. So I think the premium for Taiwan is on having everything that it needs to fight for days and weeks on the island before a conflict starts. And I think that there is a danger that there’s an assumption that Taiwan can be resupplied over time and that it only needs to hold out for x number of days and then we’ll come with more supplies. I think that’s a very dangerous assumption. So I do think that Taiwan really needs to prepare to hold out. And that goes beyond weapons, to also argue for Taiwan, you know, stockpiling oil, and gas, and potable water, and food supplies, so that its population can also hold out because getting those things into the island is going to be very, very difficult.

VIK: Is there anyone who’s advocated seriously for some sort of U.S. presence ahead of time?

SACKS: So there are some people who have advocated for that. I don’t think it’s really a mainstream view. And the reason for that is that China has at various points put forward, that a U.S. military presence on Taiwan would prompt them to launch an attack essentially. And so that is at various points, a red line put forward by China. So that’s something that we’re,careful about and I would also say that that’s another reason why Japan is so critical here. You know, geography, of course matters a lot. And if, for whatever reason we can’t use our forces on Japan, or there are limits to how we can deploy our forces who are on Japan, then you’re basically looking at Guam and Hawaii as the next closest places. And that becomes very, very precarious and worrisome.

VIK: Interesting.  Is it your sense that our troops would have enough time if China was to launch an attack to get there or you know, is that really like, is that window extraordinarily tight?

SACKS: Yeah. So there’s a couple of things at play here. First thing that I would highlight is that we need to have very good early warning indicators. Clearly, we had very good early warning indicators with Putin’s move against Ukraine. We were warning our partners, you know, months before the actual attack was ordered, that Putin was maxing forces on the border. There were discussions in the Kremlin about attacking Ukraine. And that really did help us, I think, prepare the Ukrainians for it, and also build a coalition around sanctions. So all of which is to say, we’re going to need to have similar very good early warning indicators on Chinese preparations for an attack. And one thing that I would flag is that actually, with China’s military reforms that they put forward under Xi Jinping in 2015, you know, China basically reorganized its entire military and stood up the eastern theater command opposite Taiwan, and that entire theater command is focused on a Taiwan contingency. So a lot of the forces that China would need are already placed. They’re already in place. So we wouldn’t necessarily see China draw on huge numbers of forces from other theaters and be able to observe that they were building up a lot more forces. I think there would be some of that, but I don’t think as much as we would have seen, for instance, five to ten years ago, where China would have said, “okay, we need to go draw forces from the west from the north from the south and bring them over here, assemble them and then launch an attack.” 

So I think that our indicators might have declined a little bit, which is worrying, but you know, that’s a critical element here to think about. And then the other one is obviously, how long does Taiwan hold out? You know, does Taipei look more like Kyiv or is it more like Kabul, right? And so if Taiwan puts up a stiff resistance militarily, and in terms of its civilian population, obviously that helps buy us time and that’s, that’s critical. And so I think that’s really the message that we need to hammer home with Taiwan, is that, you know, we need time, and therefore, it’s critical that Taiwan mounts a serious defense.

VIK: What message do you think the Chinese have taken from what’s happened in Ukraine?

SACKS: Yeah, I mean, I actually think that there are very worrying lessons here for China. So, I think that there’s a big danger in believing that essentially, the takeaway is, war is messy. You know, war is uncertain. Don’t try it. I actually think that one of the big Chinese lessons is that nuclear deterrence works, and Putin’s nuclear arsenal deterred the United States from intervening directly on Ukraine’s behalf. And similarly, China’s nuclear arsenal can deter the United States from direct military intervention on Taiwan’s behalf. And we’ve actually seen now that China is embarking on a pretty unprecedented nuclear buildup over the next couple of years that they’ve already started. And so, analysts have been kind of wondering, well, why is China building up its nuclear arsenal so much? What’s the purpose of that? And I think this is one of the key purposes, essentially that China can deter the United States from intervening on Taiwan’s behalf, and then, you know, that allows China to continue to conduct conventional military operations against Taiwan. So I think that’s one of the lessons. I think another lesson is actually that sanctions are painful, but are not decisive. The threat of sanctions [was] made very clear to Putin, and it didn’t change his calculus, and he still went ahead with the invasion, and he’s still in power today. And I think there’s even confidence in China that given its centrality to the global economy, unlike Russia, there would be more hesitance to sanction China the same way we’ve sanctioned Russia. Especially among European partners and some in Asia, because you would be really looking at a much more painful global kind of recession than what we’ve seen so far because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. And also, I think that’s going to lead China to nonetheless seek to make other countries more dependent on China and lessen China’s dependence on other countries, which is a strategy that Xi Jinping already had in motion prior to the invasion of Ukraine. So those are some of, I think, the critical lessons. I think there’s also an argument to be made for China to go big or elite. Clearly, Russia did not use all of the force it has at its disposal in the opening days of the conflict, which was puzzling to many observers. And so I think that this does argue for China. To go big and go hard and go fast, to try to make sure that we don’t have the time to make a decision and to come to Taiwan’s defense, and potentially that you can have so much destruction on Taiwan that the people will just cave and put up the white flag. And the final point that I would say is that I think … China prioritizes political warfare and that is a key pillar of PLA doctrine and strategy. And we’ve seen that political warfare matters because Zelensky has been able to rally the world around Ukraine and build support as well among the Ukrainian people to defend their country. And so I think that China will do everything it can to take out Taiwan’s political and military leadership early in conflict, to, you know, sow confusion, to disable them from rallying the population and rallying other countries around the world. It probably also argues for China to try to sever Taiwan’s communications with the outside world during the conflict. So I think there’s a lot of lessons China will learn. And I think there will be a period where China takes … stock of Russia’s failures and learn certain lessons, but my main takeaway would be that in five or so, five to ten years after it has kind of digested those lessons and put it through, you know, at the tactical level, China’s going to pose a much more serious threat than it had prior to the invasion.

VIK: David, thank you so much for joining us. Have a good rest of your conference and talk to you soon. Thanks so much. Bye.

Sages of the Sun is a weekly podcast produced by The New York Sun. The Sun is committed to upholding the finest journalistic traditions and staying true to our motto, “It Shines For All.”

Seth Lipsky is a seasoned veteran of the news business, and among the most revered American editors. He previously spent 20 years at the Wall Street Journal, launched the Jewish Daily Forward, and first revived the Sun back in 2002.

Caroline Vik has more than a decade of experience in policy-making, with years spent on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at the Department of Defense, and on the National Security Council.