The oilfield blockades that have dogged Libya, causing the OPEC member’s crude oil exports to fall, are soon to end — if the country’s oil point man is to be believed. The new chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation, Farhat Bengdara, was quoted in the Financial Times as saying he expects there to be “good news about this next week,” but the web of competing strategic interests in the North African country may prove tough to untangle in such a short time frame. 

That is largely down to political instability fueled in no small part by Russia. Hundreds of mercenaries with the Russian paramilitary body that is widely believed to be the de facto private army of President Putin,  the Wagner Group, are operating in Libya. 

The American Embassy in Libya is following the developments with “deep concern,” the AP reported, and in a tweet said that Libya’s  National Oil Corporation had “preserved its political independence and worked effectively during the country’s turmoil under Chairman Mustafa Sanalla.” Mr. Sanalla is the oil chief who was sacked by the nominal head of Libya’s government, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. “The reported replacement of the NOC board may be contested in court but must not become the subject of armed confrontation,” the embassy tweet added.

Underscoring Libya’s murky power dynamics, many of which hinge on oil revenues and who actually receives them,  is that the country is politically cleft. The government in the capital, Tripoli, is led by Mr. Dbeibeh, who appointed Mr. Bengdara to his new role — but may have done so by rough-and-tumble means. “Dbeibah has used armed forces to install Bengdara and Sanallah has the sympathy of several armed groups in the greater Tripoli area,” a Libya specialist, Jalel Harchaoui, who is also an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, told the AP.  Echoing the American embassy’s concern, Mr. Harchaoui said the NOC shake-up could trigger violence between militias backing opposing sides.

One of those sides is entrenched in eastern Libya, where a renegade general, Khalifa Haftar, and his Libyan National Army hold sway. It is allies of Mr. Haftar who, according to the Financial Times, have blockaded oilfields and export terminals as a means to put the squeeze on Mr. Dbeibeh. The FT reported that “oil exports have dropped from 1.2 million barrels a day to between 700,000 and 800,000 barrels per day as a result of the blockades.” By some estimates, output has dropped even lower.

With the world facing oil shortages due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Bengdara wants to be the bearer of good news. On Thursday he told a news conference at Tripoli, “We should work together to rebuild Libya’s oil production capabilities and make sure that the oil sector remains neutral to any political conflicts,” adding: “Today, oil prices have reached 100 dollars per barrel. However, Libya’s production and exports remain far below its capabilities.”

Yet the friends of Mr. Haftar may be the fly in the ointment, because so many of them are foot soldiers of the Kremlin. Even after some Wagner mercenaries were transferred to Ukraine, at least 2,000 of them remained, according to pan-Arabic newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, along with an unspecified number of Russian anti-aircraft defense systems, MiG-29 fighters, and Su-24 tactical bombers. That newspaper, citing Mr. Harchaoui, raises the prospect that Russia seized four major military bases in Libya prior to February 24 — the start of the invasion of Ukraine — and has not relinquished control since.

According to a recent article in Foreign Policy, “Wagner fighters remain entrenched in and around key military bases and oil facilities in Libya as guns-for-hire” for the Libyan National Army and are “an important part of Haftar’s campaign to wrest control of the Libyan state from Tripoli-based governments and forces.” The article also posited that “Wagner’s dug-in posture in Libya is consistent with Russia’s broader resolve,” which it says is “to pressure European NATO member states into different political outcomes by controlling proximate energy sources and sowing instability on their borders.”

The Wagner Group has already proved itself adept at sowing the kind of volatility for which Libya is infamous. Foreign policy also noted that in July 2020 Libya’s National Oil Corporation “announced that Wagner forces had effective control of production at the Sharara oil field in southwestern Libya, the country’s largest.” Furthermore, “Wagner’s stance atop Libya’s prized low-sulfur sweet crude reserves has provided the Kremlin with the strategic depth to squeeze European customers.” As the war in Ukraine drags on longer than Moscow had banked on, it has every reason to keep squeezing.

An end to oilfield shutdowns in southwestern Libya could not only ease some pressure on international energy markets but augur some easing of the protracted showdown between Mr. Dbeibeh and his rival, Fathi Bashagha, who is based in Sirte — Muammar Gaddafi’s hometown — and backed by the LNA. Or not. To date, only Moscow recognizes Mr. Bashagha’s government, and perpetuating the political crisis is all of a piece in Mr. Putin’s opaque geopolitical playbook. The American Embassy in Libya’s current warning, “Do not travel to Libya due to crime, terrorism, civil unrest, kidnapping, and armed conflict,” is possibly music to the Russian strongman’s ears.

Libya’s oil reserves are widely estimated to amount to some 48 billion barrels. That is a lot of sweet crude that could go Europe’s way. Or not. As Foreign Policy also reported, “Since 2020, Wagner has moved into position to obstruct both current outputs and any future effort by a European Union looking to curb energy dependence on Russia to tap Libya’s energy potential.”

Time will tell if internecine quarreling in the beleaguered desert nation can be put aside long enough to get more oil flowing. It will be easier said than done, especially with so many Russian hired guns on the ground — unofficially anyway, which is just how the Kremlin seems to like it.