Donald Tusk recently returned to Brussels as a “proud Pole” and a “proud European.” It is not quite clear which ascription comes first. Equally unclear is the capacity in which Mr. Tusk voyaged, for he is not yet Poland’s prime minister. Yet what is clear is that should Mr. Tusk assume the role, Poland could well see “more Paris in Warsaw,” as Mr. Tusk told President Macron of France last year — and likely not the good parts.

The October 15 Polish election saw the incumbent Law and Justice party come in as the largest party, taking 194 seats. It is, however, doubtful whether Law and Justice can find enough partners to secure the needed 231 for a parliamentary majority. Together with the center-right Third Way and the Left, Mr. Tusk’s Civic Coalition would have 248 seats in the 460-member lower house. 

Poland’s presidents have historically given the largest party the first go at forming a new government. President Duda now has until November 13 — the start of Poland’s new parliamentary session — to decide what to do. As Poles and Europeans then wait, Mr. Tusk has, in the meantime, seemingly turned to his European Union colleagues to feign premature victory.

“Time is of the essence,” Mr. Tusk said ahead of talks with the European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, last week. “All methods, including non-standard ones, must be used to save the money that Poland deserves.” The EU has since 2022 kept frozen some $37 billion in Polish recovery funds over its concerns with Poland’s rule of law. Release of the funds is contingent on judicial reforms that Law and Justice has refused.

Or so it seemed. “It will not be necessary to complete the legislative process” of judicial reform, Mr. Tusk said in conversation with Polish reporters after his exchange at Brussels. “If the president acknowledges the facts quickly … I guarantee quick payments.” Yet this is odd, as judicial reform was the very stipulation that the EU had imposed on Warsaw. Should Mr. Tusk become prime minister, then, and should the EU swiftly open its coffers, the question of whether Poland’s recovery funds were strategically withheld to sway the Polish electorate would be one worth asking.

For, for Europe, what is at stake in the Polish election is nothing less than the European project itself, one that a Law and Justice victory would undermine. The party has long rejected the idea of a centralized Europe and the primacy of EU over national laws — so-called “European sovereignty.” Mr. Tusk is of a different view, one aligned with Brussels, Berlin, and Paris. As European Council president, of Brexit Mr. Tusk warned, “there will be no cakes on the table… there will only be salt and vinegar.”

It is then little surprise that Europe has been cheered by the prospect of “Prime Minister Donald Tusk.” Of the election result, the former Belgian prime minister turned European Parliament member, Guy Verhofstadt, noted it “reinforced the EU” and was “a lesson” for the allies of Law and Justice at Brussels. Mr. Verhofstadt is among a group of German and French EU parliament members now leading the charge to amend the EU’s founding treaties.

The proposed changes, which are to be voted on during the EU’s upcoming plenary session in November, would, among other measures, eliminate member states’ veto rights in dozens of areas, including defense, taxation, and foreign policy. Warsaw or Paris, say, could then be outvoted on such matters by the EU.

Unanimity voting would be replaced with majority voting. The European Commission would be renamed the “European Executive” with its president nominated by the EU parliament and with the ability to select members along ideological lines. The parliament’s powers would be expanded, and all matters of climate and environment turned over to bureaucrats in Brussels. New “solidarity provisions” included in the EU’s treaties could yet make distribution of migrants legally mandatory. 

It is unclear whether such revisions would, in their current form, win the support of European governments. Yet as war rages in Ukraine, another front now having opened in the Middle East, and tensions between Kosovo and Serbia — to say nothing of Armenia and Azerbaijan — Europe’s appetite for a common security and defense policy appears to have increased.

At minimum, the proposed reform initiative suggests EU leaders have not yet relinquished their visions of centralized control. If not now, they are likely to attempt sometime again — perhaps, so they hope, with Mr. Tusk as their linchpin.

Mr. Tusk has rejected the idea of Poland’s participation in the forced relocation of migrants. Yet he has not fully dismissed the other proposals set forth by his former EU colleagues, other than to note they are “overly ambitious.” “It is in the interest of European citizens and member states that Europe,” Mr. Tusk says, “be as united as possible.” He has tended to move in lockstep with the EU — doing so as Poland’s prime minister from 2007 to 2014, and head of the European Council.

There is little reason to believe he would not do so again. And, even if he wished to do otherwise, it is unlikely he would have the political capital needed to do so. Should, then, Mr. Tusk become Poland’s prime minister, the notion of “more Paris in Warsaw” — in all senses of the term — would likely be more than just a fanciful maxim. One cannot help but wonder whether this is what Poles hoped for when they cast their votes.