On September 3, 2015, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin strode out to the Gate of Heavenly Peace in the center of Beijing. Together with 12,000 troops of the People’s Liberation Army, they had gathered to commemorate Victory Day, the anniversary of the end of World War II in China –– or, as it is known in Communist China, the “Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression” or the “World Anti-Fascist War.”

“The unyielding Chinese people fought gallantly and finally won total victory over the Japanese militarist aggressors, thus preserving the achievements of China’s 5,000-year-old civilization and defending the cause of peace for mankind,” the Chinese party boss said. Then, to celebrate that peace, a grand military parade was held –– an effort to display China’s strength and recall its past, or, in any case, the party’s version of it.

Like President Putin, Mr. Xi has elevated historical memory as a means of promulgating his desired narrative and justifying his policy aims. This has involved the creation of at least three new national holidays, of which Victory Day is but one; funding academic research to pair narrative with ostensible fact; and making it a criminal offense to “slander” Chinese war heroes and challenge the party’s official historical narrative.

Essential to this narrative is an appreciation of China as an anti-imperialist power. Rather than colonizing nations, Beijing sees its historic role as that of a liberator. This matters far beyond Beijing’s own borders and has often been invoked by Mr. Xi and other party officials when engaging with parts of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, including both the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani leadership. 

Yet China’s desired histories are increasingly butting up against contemporary realities. In Pakistan, Chinese nationals have been targeted by the Baloch Liberation Army, a separatist militant group from Balochistan province. In April, the group killed three Chinese teachers from Karachi University’s Confucius Institute. The institute was a “symbol of Chinese economic, cultural, and political expansionism,” the group said in a statement. It has warned of more attacks if Beijing’s “exploitation projects” continue.

This was not the first Baloch attack on Chinese assets in Pakistan. In recent years, the group has targeted the Chinese consulate, Chinese workers in the mining and shipping industries in Balochistan, as well as the Pakistani stock exchange. It has also been in battle with Pakistan’s army. It launched its deadliest spate of attacks in February, when the prime minister at the time, Imran Khan, visited his counterpart in Beijing.

The group’s anti-Chinese attacks are part of its wider struggle for a free Balochistan. Pakistan’s largest, mineral-rich province was an independent khanate before it was appropriated by the newly formed Muslim-majority state in 1948. The region has since been dotted by insurgencies, with even its mainstream nationalists believing it to be occupied territory. Increasingly, China is seen as the upholder of that occupation.

Around the same time that Messrs. Putin and Xi gathered to mark the newly concocted Victory Day in Beijing, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor was inaugurated. The $62 billion corridor is the flagship project of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative and is to date its most ambitious undertaking in any country. Much of it runs through Balochistan. 

The perception among Pakistan’s Baloch Liberation Army, as well as, and increasingly, citizens of Balochistan province, is that Beijing dictates the terms of the corridor with Islamabad but a blind follower. Even more troublesome is Beijing’s alliance with the Pakistan military ostensibly to exploit Balochistan’s resources and deny locals any share.

In December, locals led anti-Chinese protests in the city of Gwadar, where the Chinese owned and operated port could yet serve as an outpost for Beijing’s navy. The corridor links Balochistan with China’s Xinjiang province, where Beijing’s treatment of its Muslim Uyghur population has further inflamed tensions, with jihadist groups like the Pakistani Taliban also targeting China.

In July of last year, nine Chinese engineers were killed near Pakistan’s Dasu hydroelectric dam. In April, the Taliban bombed a hotel in Quetta, Balochistan’s provincial capital, where the Chinese ambassador was staying. Jihadist groups are increasingly coming to view China as a new colonial power. Like America, then, it, too, must be expelled. Yet then what of Beijing’s polished identity?

History for Xi Jinping is, like for Vladimir Putin, crucial to maintaining power at home and advancing his objectives abroad. As Mr. Putin has demonstrated in Ukraine, these narratives can be warped to justify incursions and atrocities –– even while claiming to be a liberator. Even, still, when –– as Beijing, increasingly, is in Pakistan –– under attack.