With Russia bogged down in Ukraine, Communist China may be hedging its bets on the future of President Putin.

Little noticed by the outside world, a routine trade mission trip in May by Russia’s prime minister to Shanghai spiraled into a red carpet reception at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Breaking protocol, the Chinese party boss, Xi Jinping, warmly greeted Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin for a one-on-one meeting.

Back in Moscow, Mr. Putin was watching his prime minister, the highest-ranking Russian official to visit China since Putin’s attack on Ukraine fifteen months earlier. On the prime minister’s  return, Mr. Mishustin was not invited to brief the Security Council, Russia’s highest policy-making body. Since his China trip, Mr. Mishustin, one of 13 permanent members of the Council, has failed to attend any Council meeting, Kremlinologists note, citing the Kremlin’s official website.

“China may be looking beyond Putin and seeking to cultivate alternative relationships in Russia,” an expert on Russia at the Atlantic Council, Anders Aslund, writes in a recent essay: “The Chinese have indicated distrust in Putin and they may be looking to Mishustin as a credible alternative.” The essay is called “Is China preparing for a post-Putin Russia?”

Over the last week, the aborted coup attempt against Mr. Putin was downplayed in China’s state-controlled press  and greeted by bland statements by Chinese officials. The Chinese clearly worry, though, about the stability of their number-one ally. With a 20th-century history of warlordism, Chinese commentators stress the need for party control over the military. They cite Chairman Mao’s 1938 dictum: “The party commands the gun, the gun must never be allowed to command the party.”

Two days after the coup attempt was quelled in Russia, the former editor-in-chief of China’s Global Times, Hu Xijin, said: “The rebellion will certainly impact the Kremlin’s authority. Putin will try to block the hole that Prigozhin had poked in the Russian political order. It is unknown if the Russian president will be able to do so. But Putin’s ability to deal with complex challenges should not be underestimated.”

Writing for foreign publications, some Chinese analysts have been more outspoken, warning that, in the Russia-Ukraine war, China risks being on the wrong side of history.

China should directly support Ukraine to avoid being “dragged into a quagmire of war by Russia,” a professor at Beijing’s China University of Political Science and Law, Yang Jun, wrote in a commentary published in Singapore’s Chinese-language newspaper Lianhe Zaobao.

“With the development of the current situation and the trend of the war…(China) should further adjust its position on Russia and Ukraine, make its attitude clearer, and decisively stand on the side of the victors of history.”

Two weeks ago, Chinese officials made soothing statements about Ukraine in advance of a visit to Europe by China’s premier, Li Qiang. It was his first to Europe since he took  office in March. China’s envoy to the EU, Fu Cong, was asked by reporters about Ukraine reclaiming land occupied by Russia. “I don’t see why not,” he answered. “We respect the territorial integrity of all countries. So, when China established relations with the former Soviet Union, that’s what we agreed.”

Some Chinese businesses are holding off on new investments, waiting to see how long Russia’s 70-year-old president will last. “Beijing now has more reasons to have more reservations, and to become more transactional in its dealings with Putin’s Russia,” an Australian National University political scientist, Wen-Ti Sung, tells Reuters. “There’s no point making a long-term investment in someone who may not credibly survive into the long-term.”

On the political side, China’s leadership wants stability with Russia, a key trading partner and a neighbor with a 2,615-mile-long land border, argues a Russia-China expert at American University, Joseph Torigian.

“The Chinese likely believe that Putin is still the best chance for stability in Russia and see supporting him as one of the core foundations of the relationship,” Mr. Torigian tweeted last week. “The Chinese will…fight hard against the narrative that the PRC is worried about the partnership with Moscow. Global Times has already characterized western media claims that China’s ‘bet’ on Putin was a mistake as a plot to hurt the Sino-Russian partnership.”

With the Russian cat distracted in Ukraine, the Chinese mice are at play in Central Asia, Russia’s sphere of influence since the 1850s. In Gyumri, Armenia, home to Russia’s 102nd Military Base, a Chinese firm recently won a contract to build a 90 million cubic meter reservoir. 

Originally planned during the Soviet era, the Kap reservoir project drew only two bidders — both Chinese companies. Most of the 3,000 Russian soldiers normally based in Gyumri are believed to be in Ukraine.

On May 19, President Xi hosted in Xi’an the leaders of the five Central Asian republics for the first China-Central Asia Summit. Signed at the summit was an agreement to build a 300-mile highway from Western China, across a 12,300-foot-high pass in Kyrgystan’s Tian Shan mountains, across Kyrgyzstan, and into Uzbekistan. 

From there, it would connect by road and rail to Turkey. Planners say that by cutting out Russia, the new route would reduce by one week China-Europe land shipping times.

At the summit, Mr. Xi promised the Central Asian leaders $3.6 billion in financial support and aid. He also offered military cooperation to “strengthen the defenses” of the Central Asian republics to “guarantee peace in the region.” 

It was in the following week in Beijing that Mr. Xi rolled out the red carpet for Mr. Mishustin’s debut visit to China.