The failure, between Kyiv and its transatlantic allies, to articulate a shared vision for victory in Ukraine raises the prospect — and danger — of a peace deal brokered by, of all countries, Communist China. Despite billions spent on military aid over the past two years, Ukraine’s inability to expel the Russian invaders suggests calls are likely to grow for a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

Absent a Ukrainian victory, though, what would there be to negotiate? President Zelensky’s proposed peace plan includes among its provisions the ouster of all Russian troops from Ukraine and a return to its 1991 borders. The terms are understandable and have garnered some backing. Yet Ukraine’s ability to achieve this goal militarily is in doubt. This opens the door to calls, in the West and elsewhere, to treat with Moscow. 

Meanwhile, China has a plan. Naturally, it has been endorsed by Moscow as the most sensible thus far. The 12-point blueprint, unveiled last February, borrows from Beijing’s Global Security Initiative that aims to “transcend Western geopolitical security theory” to establish a “common security.” It pays lip service to notions of sovereignty, territorial integrity, the security concerns of all, and calls for an end to unilateral sanctions.

Such “principles” also feature in the Kremlin’s playbook. Beijing’s plan would legitimize Russian revisionist claims to Ukrainian territory and necessitate reform of Europe’s security governance. This would involve a revamp of the rules, norms, and structures that underpin European security, such as they are. Any future expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be resisted, and a European nuclear deterrent dismissed.

With Beijing at the helm, the revisions would undoubtedly tilt in its favor rather than that of Europe and its allies. To say nothing of China’s authoritarianism. Yet were it only a matter of Chinese and Russian scheming — and if there were a credible Western strategy in place — such moves might be more readily opposed. So far, no such strategy exists. In their push for a new European security order, too, Moscow and Beijing are finding support.

Prime Minister Orbán has called for a new European security architecture that considers Russian interests. Budapest has endorsed Beijing’s peace proposal, with its foreign minister, Péter Szijártó, saying, “There is full consensus between us.” Mr. Orbán and President Xi are meeting this week, as Mr. Xi concludes his first European visit in five years. Eighteen new deals are set to be signed, including on security and nuclear ties.

The United Arab Emirates, which has backed, if not facilitated, Russia’s war, and has strengthened its security links to Beijing in recent years, notably through the Global Security Initiative, has also announced its involvement in Ukraine’s post-war recovery. Turkey, too. President Zelensky has previously endorsed a lead role for China in his country’s post-war reconstruction, which might explain his patience with Beijing, and Mr. Xi personally.

Meanwhile, Europe seems to think Beijing is indispensable to its security. Europe “needs China” to build peace, President Macron has said. Mr. Macron has been among Europe’s most vocal leaders regarding the need for a new European security paradigm, including a reassessment of NATO structures and a pivot away from America. Such claims delight Beijing. Yet they are risky if the aim is preservation of the liberal global order.

So far, the transatlantic approach to Ukraine has predominantly centered on providing weapons. Yet, while essential, weapons alone do not win wars. The focus on weaponry has also eclipsed other crucial factors, such as the manpower needed to deploy them — Ukraine’s military faces a shortage of about 500,000 troops — and a credible and coherent strategy to guide their use. Mere assertions that Russia cannot win is not a strategy.

As the conflict approaches what appears to be an inflection point, and Russia readies for its summer offensive to expand its foothold in Ukraine, there is an urgent need for substantive strategic deliberations — leadership — between Kyiv and its transatlantic partners regarding their desired end state. And for the end to the war to be articulated — in clear, practical, and geostrategic terms — by someone other than Xi Jinping.