Lafayette Is Not Here
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Nicolas Sarkozy had a warm and fuzzy vacation in New Hampshire this summer before cozying up to the Bushes in Maine, causing some to gush over the new love that France has for America. It’s a return to the alliance that the two countries have not seen since the Marquis de Lafayette took part in the American Revolution. Or, is it?
Mr. Sarkozy told the American press, “I just finished reading a biography of Lafayette, and I wanted to tell President Bush about that.” Given that today is the 250th anniversary of Lafayette’s birth, it’s a good time to examine the record of France’s early involvement with the United States.
For starters, George Washington did not trust the French, and with good reason. France’s King Louis XVI wasn’t helping the Thirteen Colonies to overthrow Great Britain’s king because of his devotion to liberté, égalité, and fraternité, he was looking to expand his sphere of influence over America.
France did not join the war until it looked like the Americans could win after the Continental Army won the Battle of Saratoga and captured much of the British Army. That’s when Lafayette tried to talk the Americans into invading Canada, ostensibly to destroy the British base in Quebec.
In reality, the French were seeking revenge. England had taken Quebec from France and Lafayette was salivating at the notion of being the one who could restore it to the French monarchy. Washington understood this and wrote to Congress, “As the Marquis clothed his proposition when he spoke of it to me, it would seem to originate wholly with himself; but it is far from impossible that it had its birth in the Cabinet of France and was put into this artful dress, to give it the readier currency.”
Washington knew that by inviting Louis XVI’s army into Canada, America would exchange one monarch for another. Lafayette was trying to pull a fast one. France had colonies in the Caribbean, as well as New Orleans and the Louisiana territory. If France took control of Quebec, the United States would be surrounded by French colonies that would monopolize commerce and dominate the American continent.
When the Canadian invasion did not materialize, Lafayette lamented, “I am reduced to wish to have never put the foot in America or thought of an American war.”
The commander in chief described his “alarm” and “fear” at Lafayette’s proposal to Congress, writing, “I am heartily disposed to entertain the most favourable sentiments of our new ally and to cherish them in others to a reasonable degree; but it is a maxim founded on the universal experience of mankind, that no nation is to be trusted farther than it is bound by its interest.”
More evidence of France’s interests are found in a letter that General Lebeque Duportail wrote to France’s minister of war explaining that the American Revolution “will cost France several millions, but it will be amply repaid by the destruction of the maritime power of England, which having no more colonies, will soon have no marine. Her commerce in consequence will pass to France, which will no longer have a rival among the European powers.”
When France finally did send its navy to America, General John Sullivan received daily assurances from Charles Hector D’Estaing that the French fleet would land 3,000 troops in a coordinated attack against the British on Conanicut Island. Sullivan landed his troops on the east side of the Island, but rather than attack the western shore as agreed, D’Estaing griped that Sullivan had “insulted France” by moving in too quickly. Sullivan responded by calling D’Estaing a “traitor.” The two generals almost fought a duel.
When more British ships arrived on the Atlantic horizon, the French fled to Boston. New Englanders were disgusted with the alliance with France and a riot broke out between French and American sailors on the wharves of Boston.
Eventually, the French did join the fight and America does owe a debt of gratitude to France for its help in the Revolution. But it must not blow that contribution out of proportion. It wasn’t until the end of the war that the French committed their troops in battle. The most important thing that the French did was provide 90% of the gunpowder so that the American rebels could do most of the shooting at France’s worst enemy, England.
In the current geopolitical situation, it’s great that the French want to play ball with the Americans again. But as George Washington warned two centuries ago, all nations are bounded by self-interest. As long as America understands what France’s initial interactions were about — commerce — it will see Mr. Sarkozy’s friendly gestures for what they truly are. France, which did a lot of business with Saddam Hussein, lost a lot of money and influence because of the war in Iraq. Now, Mr. Sarkozy is looking for ways to make up some of these losses.
President Bush has welcomed Mr. Sarkozy’s overtures, as he should. The questions remain: What does France want? And what does America get in return?
After the French criticized the invasion of Iraq, members of Congress ushered in the concept of “Freedom Fries” to thumb their noses at France. All that did was point out that after 200 years, America still lacks an intelligent foreign policy for dealing with the French.
Mr. Storozynski is a contributing editor of The New York Sun.