Who Won the War at Gaza?
This article is from the archive of The New York Sun before the launch of its new website in 2022. The Sun has neither altered nor updated such articles but will seek to correct any errors, mis-categorizations or other problems introduced during transfer.
Who won the Gaza war? According to the prevailing press narrative, besieged innocents in Gaza bravely withstood the withering weeklong Israeli rocket barrage until President Morsi mediated a cease-fire. End of story, except for the largely unnoticed detail that under Mr. Morsi, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood before his recent accession to power, Egypt has been the major conduit for Iranian weapons into Gaza.
For more than a decade southern Israel has been under incessant attack. In Sderot, 24,000 Israelis, predominantly immigrant families from Morocco and the Soviet Union, have lived in constant danger and unrelenting fear. Air-raid sirens punctuated their lives, providing less than half a minute to seek safety in bomb shelters. It is little wonder that nearly three-quarters of the population suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder.
Despite Operation Cast Lead, launched by Israel four years ago to halt the steady rain of missiles and rockets from Gaza, Hamas was undeterred. This year alone, more than 7,000 rockets fell on southern Israel, until Prime Minister Netanyahu finally decided to respond. Hamas weapon sites, as always embedded in civilian neighborhoods, were bombed. But tens of thousands of Israeli soldiers, positioned at the border, were not ordered to attack even as rockets fell on Ashdod, Ashkelon, Beer Sheva and the outskirts of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.
Israel, according to Intelligence Minister Dan Meridor, had applied force “in a very moderate and measured way.” That offered little solace to Israeli civilians, who have every reason to expect, based upon past experience, that the current lull is only temporary. By a 49% to 31% margin, according to aMa’ariv poll, Israelis preferred to continue the military operation rather than accept a cease-fire. By not fighting to win, Israel enabled Hamas to lead Gazans in celebration of their “great victory for the people of Palestine.”
Journalists who for years had paid no attention to besieged Israelis were mesmerized by the fortitude of Gazans. Three CNN reporters in Gaza, led by Anderson Cooper, provided constant updates on the suffering of Gazans but little was said about the role of Hamas in provoking the conflict. Christiane Amanpour conducted an interview with Hamas’s prime minister, Ismael Haniya, enabling him to stipulate “peace terms” that would return Israel to its vulnerable pre-1967 borders. In Israel there was only Wolf Blitzer, who underplayed rather than underscored the human toll from incessant attacks by Hamas.
Judi Rudoren, the new Jerusalem bureau chief of The New York Times, was mesmerized by the “pride and sacrifice” of Gazans in celebrating the disaster provoked by their leaders. No absurd claim – not even “for the first time, the Israelis are hiding, not us” – eluded her gullibility. After the fighting ended she remained ensconced in Gaza and provided a platform for a wealthy businessman and cactus grower who could not explain to his puzzled children “why Israel attacks us.” Neither, it seemed, could Mrs. Rudoren.
Mr. Netanayhu’s refusal to launch a ground attack contributed significantly to the plausibility of Hamas’s “victory” preening. Hamas played its cards well, gaining undisputable supremacy over the Palestinian Authority with its militancy, holding out long enough to generate pressure for Israel to desist before attaining its objectives, and securing Egypt and Turkey as its patrons.
After the cease-fire Israel eased restrictions on Gaza fishermen and farmers, while Hamas continued to receive military supplies from Iran. Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar explained: “We have a right to take money and weapons from Iran. They give to us for the sake of God.”
Mr. Netanyahu’s strategy of buying time has its benefits — and perils – for Israel. It can be argued, as critics on the left reflexively proclaim, that Israel must either be prepared to negotiate peace with Hamas or endure renewed missile attacks. But since Hamas has yet to relinquish its expressed determination to destroy Israel, and shows no sign of doing so, that remains a beguiling fantasy.
Any hope that Egypt might continue to be a peace broker may have been dashed on the reality of renewed street protest in Cairo over President Morsi’s declared intention to undermine judicial authority.
Ever since 1948 Israel’s security has depended upon its ability to win wars, not please its peace advocates or appease its enemies. Now as then, Israel is surrounded by Muslims who remain determined to destroy the Jewish state within any boundaries. For Israelis to have faith in their government, it must be prepared to protect them, even if that requires deployment of the Israel Defense Forces. That may be the enduring lesson of Operation Pillar of Defense if – as seems likely – the pillar once again crumbles.
Mr. Auerbach’s most recent book is “Against the Grain: A Historian’s Journey,” just out from Quid Pro.