Beyond Tripoli

If one wants a glimpse of how ominous is the politicization of our foreign policy debate in the context of the 2008 campaign, one need look no further than Tripoli, Lebanon, and Gaza. The eruption of fighting in northern Lebanon and the Gaza Strip both involve extremist Sunni Muslims, some of whom are affiliated with Qaeda. In the case of Hamas, its ties with Qaeda are strained, following the pattern of the terrorists' rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood's turn towards electoral politics. Qaeda thinks Hamas is aiming too low; there is no specifically Palestinian solution, they argue, only a pan-Islamic one. Suddenly, the march on Israel is taking a new and dangerous turn.

Yet the mere assertion of a rising Qaeda influence is greeted by jeers from the Congressional majority because it sounds like a defense of President Bush's Iraq policy. House Speaker Pelosi said on "Sixty Minutes" last fall that the terrorists in Iraq will only "stay as long as we're there. They're there because we're there." Conflating the president's assertion that Qaeda was fighting in Iraq with the debate over whether there was a link between Saddam and al Qaeda before September 11, 2001, Ms. Pelosi said back on November 27: "The 9/11 Commission dismissed that notion a long time ago and I feel sad that the president is resorting to it again." The majority leader in the Senate, Harold Reid, more recently urged Mr. Bush to "change course [away from Iraq] and turn our attention back to the war on al Qaeda and their allies."

What Mr. Bush understands is that all these are battles in a larger war. He is making the case that a withdrawal of American forces from Iraq would allow al Qaeda to secure its position. The terrorists thrive in failed or weakening states, like Lebanon and the Palestinian areas. The counter argument we hear is that if not for the American attack on Iraq and continued presence there, al Qaeda would have no foothold there. According to the Democrats, Mr. Bush is responsible for the growing terrorist concentration in the Sunni areas of Iraq.

This reminds us of the argument that if only Israel relinquished territory Muslim rage would subside. But as long as America has primary strategic interests in the region, interests that are political and economic, what Newt Gingrich refers to as "the irreconcilable wing of Islam" will remain just that, unreconciled. The same could be said for Israel. Regardless of the wisdom of this or that tactical maneuver, the extremists among the Muslims, including Hamas, will be satisfied only when Israel disappears altogether. And even that would be only a start, for their ultimate goal is to establish a new caliphate and convert, subjugate, or kill all the infidels.

So deep is the animosity toward Mr. Bush among a significant slice of the electorate that many Americans look at these problems through the prism of their anger at the president. Debate over the Iraq policy may be healthy for a democracy. Before the war, skeptics invoked the so-called Pottery Barn rule: "You break it, you own it." Now the Democrats reckon not only is Iraq broken but it's lost. Yet instead of fixing it, Democrats want to run away at a time when the regional growth of Qaeda should worry any Democrats, if there are any, who take seriously their own prospects for recapturing the White House. For any Democrat who takes office in January, 2009, will be faced with a regional attack he or she will not be able to blame on Mr. Bush.