Submitted by Elie Elhadj, Feb 24, 2008 07:55

A verdict on the "surge"

Three developments in Iraq since the middle of 2007 are noteworthy.
The first is the success of the U.S. in arming and funding Arab Sunnis in the Anbar Province and Baghdad to stop shooting at U.S. soldiers and to fight Al-Qaeda. Named Awakening forces, these have grown to more than 70,000 men. "Awakening" men patrol local areas. They get paid about $10 a day each by the U.S. Many were formerly a part of the Sunni insurgency against the occupiers and Iraqi government security forces as well as against the Shi'a militias of AbdulAziz Al-Hakeem (Badr brigade) and of Muqtada Al-Sadr (Mahdi army).
The second development has been the cease-fire on August 29, 2007 that Muqtada Al-Sadr ordered the Mahdi army militia to observe for six months, renewed on February 23, 2008 for six additional months.
Concurrent with these developments was the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report of November 2007, which stated with "high confidence" that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and has not restarted it. This NIE conclusion reversed the findings of a similar NIE report in 2005.
How is one to read these developments on the short-term and the long-term?
On the short-term, Washington is happy; the number of U.S. casualties dropped significantly to hastily declare success. Tehran is happy; the threat of a U.S. war against it has receded. Iraq's Arab Sunnis are optimistic; they think that in return for "Awakening," Washington would force the Baghdad Shi'a dominated government to amend the "federalism" provisions in Iraq's constitution and, among others, reverse Paul Bremmer's de-baathification program, which together with dissolving Iraq's army have turned Sunnis' lives upside down and cost hundreds of thousands their livelihood and lives.
The Al-Maliki government, however, is uneasy; the U.S./Sunni accommodation means U.S. pressure to give the Sunnis concessions. Iraq's defense minister stated on December 22, 2007: "Iraq will not allow US-backed neighborhood patrols to become a 'third force' alongside police and the army." Violent clashes between government security forces and Awakening units in certain areas have already been reported.
If the Iraqi government acquiesces to Sunni demands, Shi'a/ Sunni reconciliation would follow. If it rejects them, the sectarian violence would return.
As for the long-term maintenance of the current lull in American casualties, the prospect is uncertain; a function of how Tehran would manage of its relations with Washington.
Ultimately, Tehran and Washington are locked in a conflict over who would control GCC oil. Washington, being 10,000 kilometers away, has traditionally relied on military bases for decades to support helpless Arab tribal emirs, kings, sheikhs, and sultans. Iran is next door. The Bush administration's destruction of Tehran's great enemies to the east; the Wahhabi Talibans in Afghanistan, and to the west; Saddam's regime in Iraq, turned Iran into the region's major power.
Iran has a solid infrastructure of support in Southern Iraq. Most of Iraq's 15-million Shiite population live there. Shiism's holiest shrines are there. The prominent families of Najaf and Karbala trace their roots to long lines of marriages with the leading clerics families of Iran. Ayatollahs have cross-country followings. From Najaf and Karbala, Iranian clerics often led the world of Shiism.
Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani is obeyed by millions in Iraq, Iran, and beyond. Born and in Mashhad, Iran, he would not accept Iraqi citizenship. Through his disciples, he has been heavily involved in supporting Washington's designs on Iraq (see the article below: Is Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani a spiritual guide or Iraq's new political leader?). While consolidating Shi'a control, Al-Sistani has cooperated with the occupation.
Abdulaziz Al-Hakeem is the head of SCIRI and the Badr Brigade. Badr is a militia of thousands; equipped, trained, and funded by Iran. Al-Hakeem spent most of his adult life in Iran. He is the leader of the largest Parliamentary bloc. When his older brother was assassinated in August 2003, Tehran declared three days of national mourning.
Al-Sistani and Al-Hakeem may be described as Tehran's instruments to institute clerics' control over Iraq.
Muqtada Al-Sadr, on the other hand, may be described as Tehran's instrument to remove U.S. forces from Iraq.
In his mid thirties, Al-Sadr is the heir to a prominent clerics dynasty. His father was the revered Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq Al-Sadr. To improve his religious credentials, Muqtada Al-Sadr was appointed in April 2003 as the Iraq representative of Grand Ayatollah Kazim Hussein Al-Haeri, a well-regarded Iraqi in Qumm, Iran. Muqtada's uncle, another Grand Ayatollah, Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr, an associate of Grand Ayatollah Khomeini during his 13-year exile in Najaf, founded in 1958 the Islamic Daawa Party (IDP).
IDP's name describes its mission: proselytization. IDP aims at forming a theocratic state. IDP received big support from Tehran. Its leaders, Ibrahim Al-Jaafari and Nouri Al-Maliki, became Iraq's transitional prime minister and full-term prime minister, respectively. Both men lived in exile for years in Iran.
It is not surprising, therefore, that after centuries of Sunni control, the two parliamentary elections in 2005 handed Iraq's 60% Shi'a majority governmental power and, with it a central role for Tehran. Iran has superseded the U.S. as the most influential power in Iraq (Chatham House report, August 2006).
The Shiites in Arab countries look to Iran for deliverance from Sunni subjugation. To Sunnis, the Shiites are heretics. Shi'a areas in Saudi Arabia are the poorest despite containing the entire oil wealth of that country. In Bahrain, the Sunni minority mistreats the 60% Shi'a majority. In Kuwait, the Shiites are second-class citizens. In Lebanon, the Shiites are underprivileged. In Yemen, the Zaydis, a Shi'a sect, accuse the Sunni government of genocide. In Syria, until seizing power in 1970, the Alawite minority, a Shi'a sect, lived in abject poverty. In Iraq, until 2003, the Shi'a majority was deprived.
Egyptian President Mubarak declared recently that, Shiites in Arab states were more loyal to Iran than to their own countries. The notion that Iran might encourage the GCC Shiites to demand their human rights sends shivers in GCC circles and beyond.
It may be said that today the initiative is in the hands of Tehran ayatollahs. In return for cooling the Bush administration's threats to attack Iran over the nuclear issue, Tehran calmed Iraq. It may be predicted that the recent lull in American casualties could be temporary; it would end once Washington provokes Tehran.
Might the Bush administration be contemplating a restoration of Sunni control to Mesopotamia? The clock has become impossible to turn back.
Without firing a shot, Iran has won the war for Iraq.

Elie Elhadj; author: The Islamic Shield
http://www.universal-publishers.com/book.php?method=ISBN&book=1599424118
Blog: http://journals.aol.com/eeh100/daring-opinion/

Note: Comments are screened, and in some cases edited, before posting. We reserve the right to reject anything we find objectionable.